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Introduction 
Nowadays, the term euthanasia is applied to those cases when a physician, 
consciously out of compassion with his/her action or its omission causes, promotes 
or does not prevent the death of an incurably ill person or upon the person’s or his/
her legal representatives’ request or without the consent of the above mentioned 
persons, with the purpose to relieve him/her from excruciating pain and suffering or 
from a medically unjustified extension of life. Even though the definition gives a list 
of detailed activities or their omission included in the understanding of the notion 
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easy death, still erroneus application of certain valid medical decisions made, such 
as the termination of the artificial life-sustaining measures upon patients being in a 
persistent coma or vegetative state, as well as the termination of the applicability of 
terminal sedation for pain and suffering caused by an incurable disease, etc., to the 
cases of euthanasia in the scientific doctrine, such as medicine, law as well as others, 
thus distorting its understanding by obtaining the regulation that criminal liability is 
stipulated for the performance of euthanasia in the majority of countries around the 
world, exposing the legitimate activities of physicians to undergo unjustified criminal 
judgement. 
As euthanasia and valid medical decision can also pertain to yet an unborn 
life in cases when a pregnant woman is exposed to termination of premature vital 
capacity or artificial life-sustaining measures because of incurable disease, the article 
addresses the issue, which has not been widely researched in the doctrine – that of 
the legal status of a foetus as well as the rights and possibilities to be born under 
conditions when there is the necessity either to consider the interests of a mother to 
be relieved from excruciating pain and suffering, terminating her life, or to decide on 
the usefulness of further artificial life sustaining measures.
In the light of the above mentioned, the aim of the article is to find out the 
fundamental features to be considered as to within the scope of intensive care of 
incurably ill persons, the valid medical decisions made, could be distinguished from 
the cases of euthanasia, and to find out how they impact the rights of an unborn life 
and its prospects to be born. 
To achieve the aim of the research, analytical, systemic, comparative, inductive, 
deductive and logical scientific research methods were used in the course of studying 
medicine, biomedicine as well as foreign legal doctrine and practices.
1.  Brain death as a criterion for the end of life and its impact  
on the subject of debate –euthanasia
Life ceases along with the occurrence of death or, in other words, on the grounds 
of irreversible cessation of cellular biological processes and the degradation of 
proteins1, the process, which is of gradual character, and that is the reason why brain 
death and biological death are distinguished in contemporary medicine. 
The historical background of the criteria of the end of life states that already 
in ancient times the opinion of death referred to as not only the loss of the ability 
to live, but also the cessation of one’s existence, which can be caused by the failure 
of lungs, brain or heart function, the latter of which is considered the essence of 
1 Nāve. Populārā medicīnas enciklopēdija. Rīga: Galvenā enciklopēdiju redakcija, 1984, p. 343.
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life – the key organ, which functions first and dies last2, as it was shared by Greek 
physicians. Such approach to determine human death, relating it to the cessation of 
cardiac and respiratory function, lasted until the middle of the 20th century, when the 
life-sustaining medical devices advanced rapidly, allowing to prolong the human life.
As medical technologies developed and transplantation advanced, which, in 
turn, sought the necessity for intact and functional organs of the deceased, the way 
to the development of new criteria for determining death in medicine was paved3. 
The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School published the criteria for 
determining death in 1968, suggesting that the irreversible state of coma shall be 
referred to at the moment when the cessation of brain function is diagnosed. Four 
criteria for the determination were proposed: 1) unreceptivity and unresponsitivity 
to external stimuli; 2) lack of movement and breathing; 3) lack of reflexes without 
gaining approval of the brain function and 4) lack of brain electrical activity, which 
the medical devices have registered without any changes also during a revised check-
up after 24 hours4.
To start with, such criteria were established on the basis of improved reanimation 
and life-supporting measures, which have enabled to maintain the lives of patients, 
who are in a desperate condition. Despite the fact that the heart continues functioning, 
however, the brain is irreversibly damaged. Such patients suffering from constant loss 
of intellect are a burden, which shall be carried by the families or hospitals. Secondly, it 
was indicated that previous criteria of death caused arguments in respect of obtaining 
necessary organ transplants5. The aforementioned criteria were adopted in the 22nd 
World Medicine Assembly in August 1986 and included in WMA Declaration of 
Sydney on the Determination of Death and the Recovery of Organs6.
2 Pernick, M.S. Back from the Grave: Recurring Controversies over Defining and Diagnosing 
Death in History. Death: Beyond Whole – Brain Criteria. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998, p. 18–19.
3 More detailed: Shah, S.K.; Miller, F.K. Can We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions in the 
Determination of Death. American Journal of Law & Medicine. 2010, 36(4): 541; Capron, 
A.M.; Kass, L.R. A Statutory Definition of the Standarts for Determining Human Death: An 
Appraisal and a Proposal. Death, Dying and Euthanasia. Washington: University Publications 
of America, Inc., 1977, p. 40–41.
4 A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Commitee of the Harvard Medical 
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death. Journal of the American Medical Association. 
1968, 205(6): 337–338.
5 Ibid., p. 337.
6 WMA Declaration of Sydney on the Determination of Death and the Recovery of Organs. 
Adopted by the 22nd World Medical Assembly, Sydney, Australia, August 1968 and amended 
by the 35th World Medical Assembly, Venice, Italy, October 1983 and the 57th WMA General 
Assembly, Pilanesberg, South Africa, October 2006 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-02-2014]. 
<http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/d2/>.
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A medical definition brain death is recognized as of human death and is accepted 
in the USA7 and many European countries8, inter alia the Republic of Latvia. The 
Regulations No. 215 of the Cabinet of Ministers “Order on brain death diagnosis and 
biological death and passing of the deceased for interment” dated 27 March 2007 
indicates that brain death is a state of deep unconsciousness, which is characterized 
by a complete and irreversible failure of brain function, which can be concluded if 
the cardiac and respiratory functions are maintained by carrying out reanimation 
measures or intensive care and in cases when the aforementioned symptoms are 
diagnosed. It also accounts for the biological death as an irreversible loss of life 
functions of the organism, which cannot be prevented by means of reanimation 
techniques or intensive care9.
The concept of brain death is not unanimously accepted and several times it 
has undergone the criticism of medical and ethical nature, e.g., neurologist Alan 
Shewmon holds a view that the concept of brain death, which is based on brain 
functions, is essentially wrong because the brain does not outweigh other organs as 
many processes function regardless of the brain function and the human organism is 
not dead until the blood flow stops irreversibly10. Douglas N. Walton also questions 
the sufficient arguments for the established brain death criteria, leaving space 
for discussions in respect of the possibility of maintaining life functions11, once 
emphasizing that there shall be a strict distinction between determining death and 
interests of transplantation, thus preventing decision making in the cases when the 
patient is a potential donor12.
The issue of detection of the human death at the moment of brain death shall 
be discussed both from the medical point of view and from the ethical and juridical 
aspects with a special regard to usage of organs and tissues in medicine, as the options 
of biological function maintenance without brain function also cause a dilemma. On 
the one hand, the life in a human organism still persists albeit the respiratory function 
7 See: Keely, G.C., et al. Uniform Determination of Death Act. National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1980 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-02-2014]. <http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf>.
8 Chau, P-L.; Herring, J. The Meaning of Death. Death Rites and Rights. Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2007, p. 17.
9 Kārtība, kādā veicama smadzeņu un bioloģiskās nāves fakta konstatēšana un miruša cilvēka 
nodošana apbedīšanai. Latvijas Vēstnesis. 2007, Nr. 59.
10 Bernat, J.L. The Biophilosophical Basis of Whole – Brain Death. Bioethics. England: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 327. 
11 Walton, D.N. Brain Death. Ethical Considerations. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University, 
1980, p. 2.
12 Walton, D.N. On Defining Death. An Analytic Study of the Concept of Death in Philosophy 
and Medical Ethics. Monreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1979, p. 5. See also: Olsena, 
S. Miruša cilvēka aizsardzība un audu izmantošana medicīnā. Promocijas darbs. Rīga: Latvijas 
Universitāte, 2010, p. 193–194.
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being maintained artificially and no signs of brain function prevail; however, it is 
considered that the death of a human being and biological individual has occurred 
due to the irreversible death of the brain – an organ, which induces the function of 
the organism’s physiological system13.
However, from the authors’ point of view, brain death within the scope of 
euthanasia shall be regarded in a wider sense, as it is the question of when life ends and 
the being is no longer defined as a human being who has the subjective right to life. 
In respect to this, recognition that the brain is the critical system of the organism, the 
loss of which disables the organism to function, is of great significance. Furthermore, 
the brain is not replaceable; therefore, the possibility to transplant it is halted, as well 
as medical stimulation devices cannot be applied for making it function14.
Brain death is recognised as a person’s death; however, thanks to contemporary 
reanimation techniques, his/her vegetative existence form can be maintained, i.e., at 
a cellular level. Siluyanova (Силуянова), for instance, calls it a prolongation of dying 
or the zone of instability, which goes beyond the scope of ethic assumptions of a 
human being, as well as death and the Commandment “Thou shalt not kill” carries 
no meaning15. According to Goldenring16, Kluge17, Sile (Sīle)18, the patients affected 
by brain death or an irreversible state of coma or being in the condition alike are not 
regarded as independent individuals, they do not represent a human being, which 
thus cancels the right to life, and the society in turn is not obliged to protect them.
In the light of the aforementioned, a conclusion shall be drawn that in every 
individual case of brain death there is no prevailing possibility to refer to a person in 
terms of Homo sapiens and the processes occurring in the body after that are solely 
and exclusively cellular biological processes rapidly moving toward ones demise.
The activities performed by physicians in such case in the Republic of Latvia are 
stipulated in the Latvian Medical Code of Ethics19 Section 2 , paragraph 10: “If the 
lethal case is acknowledged, the final decision regarding the projections and further 
treatment tactics is made by the ad hoc council of physicians”, which, in accordance 
13 Krylova, N., Safonov, V. K. K voprosu ob opredeleniji momenta okonchanija zhizni v 
ugolovnom prave Rossijskoj Federaciji. [The Issue of Determining the End-of-life Moment in 
the Criminal Law of the Russian Federation]. Ugolovnoje pravo. 2010, (3): 55.
14 Bernat, J. L. The Biophilosophical Basis of Whole – Brain Death. Bioethics. England: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 335.
15 Silujanova, I. V. Sovremennaja medicina i pravoslavije. [Contemporary Medicine and 
Orthodoxy]. Moskva: Moskovskoje podvorje Sviato-Troickoj Lavry, 1989, p. 27. 
16 Goldenring, J. The Brain-life Theory: Towards a Consistent Biological Definition of Humanness. 
Journal of Medical Ethics. 1985, 11(4): 198–199.
17 Kluge, W.E.H. The Ethics of Deliberate Death. London: Kennika Press, 1981, p. 89.
18 Sīle, V. Medicīnas ētikas pamatprincipi. Rīga: Izdevniecība “Zinātne”, 1999, p. 79.
19 Latvijas ārstu ētikas kodekss. Ar grozījumiem, kas izdarīti 1998.gada 9.oktobrī [interactive]. 
[accessed on 10-02-2014]. <http://www.arstubiedriba.lv/images/etikaskodekss.pdf>.
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with the Medical Treatment Law20 Section 1, paragraph 6, is the discussion among 
no fewer than three physicians, including anesthesiologist-reanimatologist’s decision 
making on the discontinuation of the artificial life-sustaining medical devices.
It is noteworthy to emphasize that in the cases of brain death the ad hoc council 
of physicians does not make decisions on life or death of the patient; instead, it 
discusses whether further artificial sustaining of life function is efficient and ethical, 
as well. It indicates that it is necessary to differentiate the patient who expresses the 
will to end his/her life, thus relieving him/herself from suffering, from the patient 
who is provided with the fundamental functions of organism with the medical devices 
attached, and the organism is kept alive even though the brain is already dead. These 
particular cases are not considered euthanasia but valid medical procedure, when, 
as a rule, by having obtained a consent to the family members before physicians 
terminate useless activities.
The discontinuation of life-sustaining medical devices upon the patient who 
is ascertained brain death is acknowledged as valid medical procedure in many 
countries, e.g., Medical Confederation of the Argentine Republic Code of Ethics21 
Article 134 and the Medical Agency of Chile Code of Ethics22 Article 134 stipulates 
that in the case of brain death of a patient, the physician has no ethical obligation to 
use approaches, medication or medical devices, the use of which shall prolong the 
current state of the patient. In Spain, in the context of euthanasia, it is acknowledged 
that in these cases human life does not exist, which can be destroyed23.
There are some examples, which are opposite. In Kenya, the physician is 
authorized to perform discontinuation of life-sustaining medical devices only 
when the cardiac function has terminated, since the patient, who is diagnosed to be 
brain dead, yet his cardiac function still continues, is declared to be alive pursuant 
to the law24. In contrary to the opinion adopted by European judicial system, some 
scientists from Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, strongly oppose that 
the moment of brain death does not yet mean occurrence of death of human being, 
as it is claimed by Chong, stating that at the stage of brain death, a human can be a 
20 Ārstniecības likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis. 1997, Nr. 167.
21 Código de Ética. Confederación Médica de la República Argentina [interactive]. [accessed on 
21-07-2013]. <http://comra.org.ar/assets/images/cms/244137d29d571505be194a4573ae33cb.
pdf>.
22 Código de Ética. Colegio Médico de Chile. A.G. Santiago de Chile, 2011 [interactive]. [accessed 
on 10-02-2014]. <http://www.colegiomedico.cl/Portals/0/files/etica/120111codigo_de_etica.
pdf>. 
23 Munoz, N.P. Euthanasia in the Spanish Legal System. Euthanasia in International and 
Comparative Perspective. The Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP), 2006, p. 243.
24 Wasunna, A. End-of-Life Decision Making in Kenya. End-of-Life Decision Making. A Cross-
National Study. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press, 2005, p. 138. 
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victim of homicide, for the criterion of the death has not been proved yet25. The USA 
literature sources suggest that brain death is included in the judicial definition and 
the individual can be sentenced for homicide, regardless of the time period the victim 
has been in the state of being brain dead26. As a matter of fact, the issue of brain death 
is not the sole subject of debate within the scope of euthanasia. At present, quite often 
other valid medical procedures are erroneously related to termination of life out of 
compassion, which will be discussed in the next sections of the article. 
2.  Failure to administer medical treatment upon individuals being 
in a coma – euthanasia or valid medical procedure 
Likewise in the cases of brain death, one of the wrong assumptions is to relate the 
non-voluntary euthanasia to individuals being in coma. Many foreign authors also 
support such opinion, e.g., Agnes van der Heide27, Emily Jackson28, Dabral Anupam29. 
The core argument to object to this statement is that the target of euthanasia is to 
relieve an incurably ill individual from excruciating pain and suffering induced 
by an illness. However, in terms of medicine, the definition of coma (from Greek, 
koma means “deep sleep”) means a state of insensibility, which resembles a deep 
sleep, and the patient cannot be awoken with the help of external stimuli30. Not only 
the disorders of respiratory functions and circulatory system, but also absence of 
reflexes and failure of reaction to external stimuli, such as sound, light, pain, etc., are 
25 See: Kavaguchi, H. Ugolovno-pravovyje problemy transplantaciji organov v Japoniji (Referat). 
[Legal Drawbacks for Transplantation of Organs in Japan (A Report)]. Sovremennoje 
medicinskoje pravo v Rossiji i za rubezhom. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov. [Contemporary Medical 
Law in Russia and Abroad. Collection of Scholarlies]. Moskva: INION RAN, 2003, p. 309–310; 
Chong Kh.-M. Pomoshch v smerti i ugolovnoje pravo: jevtanazija v prave Juzhnoj Koreji 
(referat) [Help in Dying and Criminal Law: Euthanasia in the Legislation of West Corea (A 
Report)]. Sovremennoje medicinskoje pravo v Rossiji i za rubezhom. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov 
[Contemporary Medical Law in Russia and Abroad. Collection of Scholarlies]. Moskva: INION 
RAN, 2003, p. 404–405. 
26 See: Fischer, C.; Kaplan, O.C. Medical USMLE. Medical Ethics. New York: Kaplan Publishing, 
2009, p. 39.
27 Heide, A. Physician Assistance in Dying Without an Explicit Request by the Patient. Physician-
Assisted Death in Perspective. Assessing the Dutch Experience. United States of America: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 137.
28 Jackson, E.; Keown, J. Debating Euthanasia. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2012, p. 2.
29 Dabral, A. Dying with Dignity. A Legal, Religious and Political Insight into the Issue of 
Euthanasia. Civil & Military Law Journal. 2010, 46(3): 236.
30 Margaret, A., et al. The Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine. Second edition. Volume 2 C-F. Detroit, 
New York, San Diego, San Francisco, Boston, New Haven, Conn., Waterville, Maine, London, 
Munich: Gale Group Thomson Learning, 2002, p. 866.
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observed31. Even though the clinical praxis does not exclude the likeliness that the 
individuals being in a coma partly have the ability to feel, these are, however, very 
rare occasions and they presume the contrary. Thus, pain cannot be acknowledged 
as conscious. Within the scope of medical as well as law sciences, the individuals in 
a coma cannot be regarded as the ones exposed to excruciating pain and suffering, 
irrespectively they are or are not incurably ill.
A conclusion can be drawn that euthanasia cannot be related to comatose 
patients since suffering, which should be felt, does not prevail or it cannot be 
classified as unbearable without the possibility to ease, as it is approved in foreign 
literature sources32. It should be added that if the cessation of the individual’s life 
being in a coma is prompted by a physician, basing on the pilot approaches stated in 
the theory and practice of medicine and the final decision made by ad hoc council of 
physicians acknowledging that further sustainability of life is useless, such activities 
shall be qualified as a valid medical procedure under particular clinical conditions. 
Similar legal assessment is applied to those decisions, regarding the patients being in 
a persistent vegetative state and their care provided by physicians, which is discussed 
in the next section.
3. Persistent vegetative state – precluding condition of euthanasia
The subject of discussion hereof is the admissibility of termination of treatment 
of those patients, who are in a persistent vegetative state and an obvious inefficiency 
of treatment is observed since their consciousness is irreversibly lost as a result of 
patients’ brain damage, except the brain stem, which still functions33.
On the condition that the life-sustaining medical devices just imitate the signs 
of life of a patient diagnosed brain dead, when the individual practically is already 
dead, the brain stem of the human being in a persistent vegetative state enables to 
maintain organism functions, such as heart rate, breathing, deglutition, thus showing 
evidence that the ability of the organism to live is quite autonomous. The use of 
artificial life-sustaining medical devices is, in turn, related to the complications faced 
while undergoing a medical treatment, e.g., the organism cannot provide itself with 
enough food, liquid, breathing, etc. It should be notably emphasized that even though 
the patients being in a persistent vegetative state do not have consciousness34, the 
irregularity of the electroencephalogram (EEG) axis is common, i.e., the function of 
31 Ibid.
32 Legemaate, J. Classification and Definitions. Dutch Developments. Physician-Assisted Death in 
Perspective. Assessing the Dutch Experience. United States of America: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, p. 31.
33 Brāzma, G. Bioētika. Cilvēka dzīvības radīšana un pārtraukšana. Jelgava: LLU, 2010, p. 96.
34 Chau, P-L.; Herring, J. The Meaning of Death. Death Rites and Rights. Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2007, p. 15.
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the brain is registered, which depends on the localisation and the extent of damages35, 
thus, it is impossible to acknowledge them being dead in terms of de facto and de jure.
Disagreements do not occur in the cases when a patient has advanced directives 
for medical decisions in such situations, and with respect to their autonomy, the 
termination of medical treatment is required. Whereas, legally ambiguous assessment 
pertains to those cases when the patient’s true will is unknown; however, further 
health care from the physician’s or patient representatives’ point of view is inefficient 
and/or excruciating for the patient.
It is questionable whether in the cases of termination of treatment by not 
obtaining a request from the individual, the passive non-voluntary euthanasia should 
be the subject of debate, taking into consideration the fact that the person being in a 
persistent vegetative state contrary to comatose patients and those certified as brain-
dead usually react either on pain or other external stimuli. Noteworthy is the fact that 
the character of a vegetative state is expressed by reacting to pain stimuli, instinctively, 
not at the level of consciousness. There is no reason to qualify for euthanasia if there 
is a lack of consciousness of pain and suffering, as it was previously stated. That is why 
in all those cases, when the treatment of a patient being in a persistent vegetative state 
is terminated, the activity of the performer shall be regarded either as a valid medical 
procedure, or an offence against one’s life, and it shall be judged from the aspect 
of the criminal law. Nonetheless, the discussions are intensified due to not only the 
cessation of treatment or non-initiation of the treatment of incurably ill patients of 
certain categories, but, within the scope of euthanasia, a great significance is paid to 
the legitimacy of the use of such medical means and methods, which, when adapted 
intentionally, foster or cause patient’s death.
4.  Distinguishing criteria of deep and continuous palliative 
sedation as well as life-shortening drugs from euthanasia
Nowadays, there is a wide range of palliative medications, which can be applied 
for sedation and control of pain and other incurable disease-related symptoms. Yet, 
the usage of them along with a successful result can cause side effects, which might 
be related to the shortening of the patient’s life and in some cases even cause his/her 
death36. Taking into consideration the fact that the choice between the prescription 
of a particular medication or withdrawal of its usage has become a common medical 
decision practice, especially by treating terminally ill patients, only the patient’s 
35 Cranford, R.E. Brain Death and the Persistent Vegetative State. Legal and Ethical Aspects 
of Treating Critically and Terminally Ill Patients. Ann Arbor, Michigan, Washington, D.C.: 
AUPHA Press, 1982, p. 72.
36 More detailed: Sumner, L.W. Assisted Death. A Study in Ethics and Law. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, p. 49; Otlowski, M. Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law. New 
York: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 139.
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physician is authorised to make such subjective decision, which, as a rule, is related to 
the so-called principle of double-effect.
According to the doctrine of double-effect, the physicians who foresee a success 
in terms of relieving the patient from pain and use sedatives for this purpose to such 
extent, which simultaneously can shorten the patient’s life or cause death, cannot be 
accused of homicide just because they also predict the worst possible consequences – 
the death of a patient37. The issue is still topical concerning the assessment of the 
activities by acknowledging them as acceptable or as an active form of euthanasia. 
In the course of time, when there was not a strict demarcation line at the level 
of theory, a pseudo-euthanasia form was developed, namely indirect euthanasia, 
which is used to describe the cases when life is terminated on the grounds of side 
effects, within the framework of pain sedation or its prevention38. Supposedly, the 
main difference between euthanasia and pain control is the aim to be achieved. 
The opinion expressed in the foreign literature, on acknowledging the application 
of sedatives as “standard medical practice”, should be agreed to, since the target of 
euthanasia is to relieve from suffering by causing the death of an incurably ill person, 
whereas the key target of treatment when sedatives are applied is to lessen suffering, 
but not to shorten patient’s life or cause death, which is solely and exclusively an 
undesired side-effect39.
However, considering the dosage of medication, the possible negative side-
effects, which can be the patient’s shortening of life or his/her death, are the utmost 
ways of incurable patients’ care. Their applicability, from the authors’ point of 
view, is possible only when the patient is in a terminal state and suffering caused by 
illness, which cannot be treated by intensive care approaches. As Jackson reasonably 
emphasizes, the physician who prescribes the deadly dosage of sedatives to the 
incurably ill patient, death must not be the principal end-in-itself; instead, he shall 
decide that in the interests of the patient palliation outweighs the interest of the 
continuation of life40.
Within the scope of the double-effect principle, palliative sedation shall be 
critically analysed in such cases, when it is deep and constantly applied, which is 
37 Jackson, E.; Keown, J. Debating Euthanasia. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2012, p. 14.
38 Weyers, H. The Legalization of Euthanasia in the Netherlands. Revolutionary Normality. 
Physician-Assisted Death in Perspective. Assessing the Dutch Experience. United States of 
America: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 38. 
39 Somerville, M. Death Talk. The Case against Euthanasia and Physician – Assisted Suicide. 
London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001, p. 202; Griffiths, J.; Bood, A.; Weyers, H. 
Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998, p. 
162.
40 Jackson, E.; Keown, J. Debating Euthanasia. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2012, p. 15.
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also sometimes called terminal sedation, when the state of unconsciousness is caused 
upon a patient till the moment death occurs, declaring that its major aim is the 
patient’s relieve from pain and suffering caused by an illness, and the medication 
applied has caused patient’s state alike coma41. The notability of the issue is indicated 
only by the fact that in 2009 the European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) 
criticised the cases, when, in fact, euthanasia was performed under applicability of 
deep palliative sedation cover, when physicians deliberately increased the dosage of 
medication relieving the patient from suffering, but inevitably causing death, which 
was considered to be a display of deviation and which in theory is known as slow 
euthanasia. The EAPCA also established guidelines42 on ethical, medical and judicial 
prerogatives of sedation within the framework of palliative care by acknowledging it 
to be admissible medical practice provided that it is used in accordance with its aim. 
Yet, it is highlighted in the document that palliative sedation is the utmost remedy for 
pain prevention, as it is related to several potential risks to shorten the life expectancy 
of a patient. 
Albeit the aim of deep and ceaseless sedation and euthanasia is obviously 
identical, i.e., to relieve an incurably ill person from excruciating pain and suffering, 
yet the basic difference between them persists, which thus allows to differentiate a 
valid medical procedure from criminal offence, which is regarded as such in most 
countries of the world, i.e., active voluntary or non-voluntary euthanasia in the sense 
that the aim of the cases of deep and continuous palliative sedation is reached when 
deep unconscious state of a patient is maintained, and, in turn, active voluntary or 
non-voluntary euthanasia leads to person’s death. That is why in cases when the 
palliative sedation is applied only for the sake of the aim it is not acknowledged 
to be a ceaseless form of euthanasia, but a valid medical practice for an incurably 
ill person’s care. A similar opinion is also stated in foreign legal doctrine, where it 
is considered that if the palliative sedation is applied pro rata, to gain appropriate 
control over pain, it cannot be compared to the termination of life43. Still, a different 
solution from the situations, regarding the cases analysed in the previous sections, is 
required, namely when valid medical decision impacts the interests of yet an unborn 
life, which is described in the next section.
41 Smith, S.W. End-of-Life Decisions in Medical Care: Principles and Policies for Regulating the 
Dying Process. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 11.
42 Cherny, I.N.; Radbruch, L. European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) Recommended 
Framework for the Use of Sedation in Palliative Care. Palliative Medicine. 2009, 23(7): 581.
43 Legemaate, J., et al. Palliative Sedation in the Netherlands: Starting Point and Contents of a 
National Guideline. European Journal of Health Law. 2007, 14(1): 66.
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5.  The “dignity” of foetus in the cases of termination of life  
or non-sustaining of an incurably ill pregnant woman
In respect of the context of valid medical decision, even though occurring rather 
rarely, the starting point is topical for a human life, i.e., from the point of view of an 
embryo and foetus, and evaluating it with regard to the situations, when a pregnant 
woman is, for instance, in a coma or in a persistent vegetative state, as well as in 
situations, when brain death is ascertained. Moreover, the respective issue is of great 
importance within the scope of euthanasia, when the pregnant woman is the one 
initiating a premature termination of life in order to terminate the pain and suffering 
caused by an incurable disease. As the right to life and life as such are different 
categories, it is crucial to determine the life as a biological category and subjective 
rights to life at the moment of conception, particularly, to clarify whether a difference 
persists between these categories in the sense of time, which is topical when dealing 
with moral and legal aspects of an unborn life.
Even though the right to life is consolidated in all contemporary international 
human rights documents, none of them stipulates the status of an unborn child or 
nasciturus, the one, which will be born in the future44. The answer regarding the 
issue of the right to life applicable to unborn children is not found in the practice 
of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights, the latter of which in several judgements points out that the understanding 
of the beginning of life falls within the margin of appreciation of the State, since the 
European countries have not reached consensus on the definition of the starting point 
for human life45. The European Commission of Human Rights in turn has indicated 
that when the consensus among the countries will be reached, the Commission will 
provide its assessment, as well46.
Article 93 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia47 declares that “Everyone’s 
right to life is protected by law.” Considering the fact that only a born and alive 
human being can be involved in legal relations, since the subjective rights can be 
applicable to a real existing subject, thus, concluding that the notion “everyone” used 
44 See, for example: Smith, R.K.M. Textbook on International Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, p. 208; Dijk, V.P., et al. Theory and Practice of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 4th edition. Antwerpen, Oxford: Intersentia, 2006, p. 387–388. 
45 The decisions of European Court of Human Rights regarding the case: Vo v. France [GC], 
No. 53924/00, § 82, ECHR 2004-VIII; Tysiac v. Poland, No. 5410/03, § 74, ECHR 2007-1; Evans 
v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 6339/05, § 54, ECHR 2007-I, etc. Also, having regard to the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the issue, see as well: Jacobs, F.; 
White, R.; Ovey, C. The European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010, p. 71, 162–165. 
46 Schutter, O. International Human Rights Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 
p. 404–410.
47 Latvijas Republikas Satversme. Latvijas Vēstnesis. 1993, Nr. 43.
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in state fundamental law does not stipulate unborn in this respect. Although Article 
1 of the Law on Sexual and Reproductive Health48 indicates that the target of the law 
is to determine the legal relations in the fields of sexual and reproductive health, this 
legislation does not contain any concrete guidelines considering the protection of 
unborn life. The rights of the foetus to be born are not taken into consideration in 
the Republic of Latvia, as it is approved in the cases, when the legislator initiates the 
protection of life with means of criminal law49 at the right moment when the foetus in 
the end of the birth or by surgical intervention becomes a born child.
With respect to the issue of conception of a human life, it is crucial to pay 
attention to contemporary fundamental concepts of embryogenesis, in particular, 
that from the moment of fertilization, two parental gametes generate a new 
biological organism – zygote, which contains a new individualised programme, and 
the new organism is a new human individual with his/her own genetic code50. The 
development of a human being is a continuous process51, which is characterised by a 
significant feature of embryo and foetus – inborn potential, which also stipulates the 
potential right to life of an unborn child, which he/she possesses from the moment of 
conception and reaches its peak along with the vital capacity52.
Supposedly, that is why in respect to the earliest stage of human biological 
life or the stage of intrauterine development it would be more appropriate to 
regard the foetus’ right to be born, not the subjective right to life, but his/her right 
to adequate protection from every possible illegitimate threats, thus ensuring a 
successful developmental process. To make this right legitimate, an appropriate legal 
framework is required, as in the case of the Constitution of Ireland, which, according 
to Article 40, section 3, clause 3 ̊  from 29 December 1937, stipulates that “The state 
acknowledges the right to life of unborn to the same extent as of his/her mother 
(...)”53, while in Hungary, for example, according to the Fundamental Law Article 2, 
section 1 dated on 25 April 2011, the life of an embryo and foetus is the subject to be 
protected from the moment of conception54, as well as in other countries.
Regarding the issue of legal protection of an unborn life within the scope of the 
topic of the article, it is important to distinguish active voluntary euthanasia and 
48 Seksuālās un reproduktīvās veselības likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis. 2002, Nr. 27.
49 Krimināllikums. Latvijas Vēstnesis. 1998, Nr. 199/200.
50 Sgrecha, E., Tambonne, V. Bioetika  [Bioethics]. Moskva: Bibleisko-bogoslovskij institut Sv. 
Apostola Andreja, 2002, p. 154–157.
51 Mežinska, S. Biomedicīnas ētikas problēmas. Biomedicīnas ētika: teorija un prakse. Rīga: Rīgas 
Stradiņa universitāte, 2006, p. 107.
52 Vēvere, G. Tiesības uz dzīvību: saturs un izpratne. Jurista Vārds. 2010, 45(640): 23.
53 Bunreacht na hÉireann [interactive]. [accessed on 10-02-2014]. <http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/
attached_files/Pdf%20files/Constitution%20of%20Ireland%20%28Irish%29.pdf>.
54 The Fundamental Law of Hungary: Law of Hungary. 25 April 2011 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-
02-2014]. <http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/c3/30000/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20
LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf>.
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usage of such medication and/or approaches, the undesired side effect of which is 
related to the shortening of the life of a pregnant woman or her death from those 
cases, when the diagnosis of the patient is brain death, irreversible state of coma or a 
persistent vegetative state.
Regarding the cases of euthanasia and the principle of double-effect, it is crucial 
to note the particular moment, when not only the embryo, or at a later stage – the 
foetus, gains the legal protection, on which the admissibility of planned activities 
depends, but also the stage of development of the foetus and the predicted life 
duration of the pregnant woman shall be noted at the moment of decision making; 
however, in those countries, in which euthanasia is not legal, the qualification of the 
performer is noted. 
It should be noted that ignoring the interests of an unborn child as well as ignoring 
the mother’s interests to be relieved from suffering shall not be acceptable in the sense 
that in every case prior to any medical intervention, be it medication, the side effect of 
which is related to the shortening of the life duration of the pregnant woman, or some 
of the forms of euthanasia, which also directly leaves an impact on the foetus in terms 
of its future vital capacity, the physicians, if only the process of decision making does 
not happen in urgent cases, shall assess the possibilities to retain unborn life and take 
every possible step to achieve a particular aim. A premature Caesarean operation, 
for example, can be mentioned as a possible solution, unless the life and health of 
the pregnant woman is threatened and foetus is in such a developmental stage, that 
a realistic possibility of its survival also prevails outside of the mother’s body, which 
can be compensated with the support of medical means and devices. If it is possible 
to postpone the use of radical medical means or euthanasia until the moment the 
pregnant woman carries the foetus, the moment itself can initiate an independent 
life outside her body, yet in such cases to avoid prolongation of unjustified suffering 
a special regard shall be paid to the lifespan of a foetus, which should exceed the 
predictable life duration of the pregnant woman and only then if a mutual consent 
about the applicable approach is reached among all parties involved. 
A slightly different legal assessment has cases, when the mother of foetus suffers 
from brain death and, de facto, she is declared dead. According to Daniel Sperling, 
medical technologies have advanced to such a level, that the physicians have the 
possibility as never before to control the moment when death occurs, enabling to 
sustain the vital capacity of a pregnant woman, whose brain is dead, to maintain the 
development of foetus up to 107 days55. Furthermore, in the 21st century, court praxis 
is developing regarding this issue, the proof of which is University Health Services v. 
Piazzi case56, when the Court of Georgia satisfied the claim of a medical institution 
55 Sperling, D. Maternal Brain Death. American Journal of Law & Medicine. 2004, 30(4): 454.
56 University Health Services v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464. Cited: Sperling, D. Maternal Brain 
Death. American Journal of Law & Medicine. 2004, 30(4): 494. 
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not to terminate the applicability of life-sustaining medical devices upon a pregnant 
woman, who was ascertained brain death, until the birth of the child. Considering 
the possible ethics-related issues, it is supposed that at present no noticeable judicial 
arguments are observed for the prohibition of applicability of such practice, hence 
in such cases there is no legal subject present, whose rights are involved because of 
it. And even though contrary to the cases of brain death, the patients being in an 
irreversible state of coma or those being in a persistent vegetative state, as concluded 
previously, cannot be acknowledged dead de facto and de jure; also, their artificial 
sustaining of life cannot be contrary to legal and medico-ethical standards if only 
the pregnant woman’s organism is temporary used and is justified with the foetus 
interests to be born on the grounds of consensus made among physicians and the 
representatives.
Conclusions
Nowadays, in the theory of medicine and law as well as in practice, biological 
death and brain death are defined and also acknowledged, considering the fact that 
along with the diagnosis of brain death the patient within the scope of legal science 
loses the designation human being, who has the subjective right to life. Therefore, the 
decision of the ad hoc council of physicians to terminate the measures for artificial 
sustaining of life, which in the end shall cause biological death, is not related to any 
form and kind of euthanasia, but is to be considered a valid ethical, legal and medical 
procedure, which is justified on the grounds of the loss of the efficiency of the above 
mentioned support measures further to be carried out. 
Passive non-voluntary euthanasia cannot be qualified as such to persons, who 
are in a coma or in a persistent vegetative state. If such cessation of life has been 
induced by a physician, basing on the methods approved by medical theories and 
practice, and the verdict made by the ad hoc council of physicians, acknowledging 
that the further artificial sustaining of life is useless, then such cases shall be regarded 
as particular valid medical procedures under particular clinical conditions, since 
there is no prevailing pain and suffering of patients involved, which is a compulsory 
prerogative for the performance of any form of euthanasia upon the patient, or the 
pain and suffering cannot be regarded as unbearable without any possibility to ease 
them.
Even though the aim of the deep and continuous palliative sedation and euthanasia 
is identical, i.e., to relieve incurably ill person from excruciating pain and suffering, 
yet the way of achieving it differs radically, namely in the first case it is achieved 
when the state of deep unconscious state is caused well before the moment when the 
patient’s death occurs, but in the case of euthanasia it is achieved immediately by 
causing a person’s death. Therefore, in cases, when deep and continuous palliative 
sedation is applied in accordance with its aim, it is not acknowledged as a persistent 
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form of euthanasia, but as a valid medical practice for the care of incurably ill persons. 
The example mentioned before is analogically related to the situations emerging as a 
consequence of the so called principle of double-effect.
In every case prior to the performance of any medical manipulation, be it 
medication, the undesired side-effect of which is related to the shortening of the 
lifespan of a pregnant woman, or some form of euthanasia, which also directly 
impacts the issue of the vital capacity of foetus, the physicians – unless the decision 
making process takes place in emergency situations – shall evaluate the possibilities 
of sustaining an unborn life and do their best to achieve this aim. Also, the patient’s 
right to be relieved from pain and suffering caused by the disease should be taken 
into consideration. In cases, when brain death is diagnosed upon a pregnant woman, 
or she is in a persistent vegetative state, her artificial sustaining of life cannot be in 
conflict with the standards of medical ethics and legal standards, provided that the 
temporary usage of organism of a pregnant woman is justified due to the interests 
of foetus to be born by consensus made among the physicians and the patient’s 
representatives.
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EUTANAZIJOS ATSKYRIMAS NUO TEISĖTO MEDICININIO  
SPRENDIMO IR JO POVEIKIS NEGIMUSIAI GYVYBEI
Rihards Poļaks, Valentija Liholaja
Latvijos universitetas, Latvija
Anotacija. Straipsnyje analizuojama eutanazijos ir teisėtų medicininių spren-
dimų, kuriuos priima medikai, rūpindamiesi nepagydomai sergančiais ligoniais, ta-
koskyra. Kadangi analizuojant atskiras eutanazijos formas pastebimos analogijos su 
medicinos procedūromis, pavyzdžiui, gyvybės funkcijas palaikančių aparatų atjungi-
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mas pacientams, kuriems konstatuota smegenų mirtis ar kurie yra vegetacinės būklės 
ir pan., straipsnyje analizuojami dažniausi atvejai, kai medikų sprendimas ir kaip jo 
rezultatas atlikti veiksmai ar neveikimas sukelia poreikį aiškintis tokio sprendimo tei-
sėtumą, atskiriant jį nuo baudžiamųjų veikų, kuriomis tokio pobūdžio veiksmai yra 
laikomi daugelyje pasaulio valstybių. Kadangi praktikoje kiekvienas tokio tipo spren-
dimas gali turėti įtakos negimusiai gyvybei, straipsnyje taip pat analizuojamos vaisiaus 
teisės ir galimybės gimti tokiomis aplinkybėmis, kai besilaukiančios moters gyvybei gre-
sia pavojus dėl nepagydomos ligos. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: aktyvi savanoriška eutanazija, aktyvi ir pasyvi nesavano-
riška eutanazija, terminalinė sedacija, smegenų mirtis, dvigubo poveikio principas, 
nuolatinė vegetacinė būk lė, negimusios gyvybės teisinė apsauga.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN EUTHANASIA AND VALID MEDICAL 
DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON UNBORN LIFE
Rihards Polaks, Valentija Liholaja
University of Latvia, Latvia
Summary. The article is dedicated to revealing those aspects which allow to 
distinguish euthanasia from valid medical decisions which are made by physicians 
within the scope of the care of incurably ill persons and their impact on the issue 
regarding yet unborn life. As in separate forms of euthanasia and the realisation of its 
kinds, analogies of valid medical procedure are observed, the article analyses the most 
common cases when the decision made by the physician and the resultant action or 
omission of the action binds him/her to unjustified criminal judgement by revealing 
the fundamental features which approve the legitimacy of the decision made, thus 
distinguishing it from the criminal offence, which is considered to be in most countries 
around the world, i.e. euthanasia.
Within the scope of research, it is concluded that nowadays passive non-voluntary 
euthanasia cannot be applied to the cases when artificial life-sustaining measures are 
terminated upon the patients who are diagnosed brain dead, coma or a persistent 
vegetative state, as in all these cases a compulsory prerogative of performance for every 
form of euthanasia and its kinds is missing, i.e. excruciating pain and sufferings caused 
by incurable disease, which a patient shall not only feel, but also realise. However, a 
different judicial assessment is regarded to such applicability of medical aids or methods, 
the undesired side-effect of which is related to shortening of lifespan or even death of 
a patient, which results from the “double-effect principle”. In such cases, valid medical 
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procedure can be talked about if separate applicability of medication or enhancing 
of the dosage, or deep and continuous palliative sedation is based on the necessity to 
release incurably ill person from pain and sufferings caused by disease not to cause his/
her death and only then when under concrete clinical conditions it cannot be done by 
other sources or approaches.
Considering that the cases analysed in the article can affect yet unborn life, in 
every such situation prior performing any medical manipulation, in the result of which 
death of an incurably ill pregnant woman will or can occur, physicians shall assess the 
possibilities of sustaining the unborn life and do their best to reach this aim.
Keywords: active voluntary euthanasia, active and passive non-voluntary 
euthanasia, brain death, “principle of double-effect”, terminal sedation, persistent 
vegetative state, legal protection of an unborn life.
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